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Abstract
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve,
some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may
revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s
type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of pooling equilibria.
If one eliminates belief systems that violate the “intuitive criterion”, one
obtains a unique equilibrium reserve price equal to the seller’s own valuation.
Paradoxically, even if bidders initially believe that the auctioneer is bound by
his reserve almost with certainty, commitment has no value.
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1 Introduction
Anecdotal evidence indicates that some auctioneers do not always stick to the
announced rules and occasionally revoke the reserve if no bids are forthcoming.
Typically, this action ignites bidding and it is not uncommon that the closing bid
exceeds the initial reserve. This suggests that bidders anticipate the auctioneer’s
lack of perfect commitment and sometimes take a gamble and forgo meeting the
reserve, hoping that the reserve is revoked and a bargain may be struck at a price
below the reserve, while risking no trade.
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Whereas this behavior is endemic in low to medium caliber auctions1, major auction
houses tend to stick to the stipulated reserve. However, they have a similar tendency
to bypass their rules by discreetly re-auctioning objects that did not meet the reserve.
Such behavior is reported repeatedly by those who keep track of the performance of
major auction houses like Christie’s and Sotheby’s.
In the present paper, we attempt a rational reconstruction of this behavior in auctions,
focusing on open ascending bid (English) auctions. For this purpose we first analyze
the equilibrium behavior of bidders who believe that the auctioneer revokes the
reserve if it is not met, with some probability. Not surprisingly, we find that bidders
forgo bidding and speculate on a revocation of the reserve if and only if their
valuation is relatively close to the initial reserve. For high valuation bidders it does
not pay to take the risk of foregoing trade by not meeting the reserve.
However, bidders’ beliefs cannot be arbitrary; they must be supported by rationally
predicted behavior of the auctioneer. This brings us to the second component of
our analysis. There we assume that the reserve price may inadvertently signal his
type. Bidders have prior non-degenerate beliefs concerning the type of auctioneer,
and update their beliefs after observing the reserve set by the auctioneer. If, in
equilibrium, the two types of auctioneer set different reserves, bidders can perfectly
infer the auctioneer’s type after observing the reserve; whereas if they “pool” and
set the same reserve, beliefs remain unchanged.
Like in standard signaling games where signals are proactively use to reveal one’s
type, the present game admits a multitude of equilibria that exhibit either pooling
(same reserves) or full revelation (distinct reserves). This multitude is of course due
to the arbitrariness of “off-equilibrium” beliefs, where Bayes’ rule cannot be applied
to assure consistency of beliefs with equilibrium strategies. Therefore, one needs to
eliminate implausible beliefs by applying well-known equilibrium refinements such
as the “intuitive criterion” introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987).2
After applying the intuitive criterion the number of equilibria is drastically reduced.
Only one pooling and one separating equilibrium survives. Interestingly, in the
unique separating equilibrium, the auctioneer who is committed to never revoke
his reserve price must set a reserve price equal to zero, and in the unique pooling
equilibrium both types of auctioneers set a reserve equal to zero. Therefore, in both
equilibria, commitment has no value. We thus arrive at the paradoxical conclusion
that no matter how unlikely it is that the auctioneer lacks commitment, commitment
has no value.
1A case in point is the annual Christmas Art Auction of the Berlin Senate. There, the city
government auctions the work of artists who were supported by a fellowship. In these auctions, the
auctioneer occasionally initiated the breach of his rules with the words “Just once, I revoke the reserve
. . . ”.
2For a detailed survey of various equilibrium refinements see Van Damme (2002) and Kreps (1990,
Sects. 12.7, 13.4).
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This finding is somewhat similar to a well-known paradox by Bagwell (1995) who
observed in the framework of a duopoly game that imperfect observability of the first
mover’s actions tends to destroy the value of commitment. However, in the present
paper the erosion of the value of commitment is not due to imperfect observability,
and it is not restricted to pure strategy equilibria, because we also cover mixed
equilibria.3
Imperfect commitment in English auctions has also been studied by Caillaud and
Mezzetti (2004) in the context of a sequence of two English clock auctions of two
identical objects. They assume that the auctioneer cannot commit to a sequence of
reserve prices, although he can commit to a reserve price in each of the two auctions.
Subsequently, the auctioneer takes advantage of the information revealed by the
outcome of the first auction to set the optimal reserve price in the second auction.
In turn, bidders respond by not bidding in the first auction unless their valuation is
sufficiently larger than the reserve price. Therefore, the equilibrium exhibits some
pooling property, similar to the analysis of auctions with resale opportunities by
Haile (2000).
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we spell out the assumptions.
In Section 3 we analyze equilibrium bidding for given beliefs concerning the
auctioneer’s type, and in Section 4 we analyze the signaling equilibrium reserve
prices, followed by a proof that a standard equilibrium refinement yields one unique
separating and one unique pooling equilibrium (Section 5). The paper closes with a
discussion in Section 6.
2 Model
Consider an open, ascending-bid English clock auction. There, the auctioneer
quotes a reserve price. A bid is an expressed willingness to buy the object at the
stipulated price. If two or more bids are submitted at the given price, the auctioneer
continuously increases that price until there is no excess demand. Once a bidder
has failed to bid at a certain price, he is no longer permitted to bid at higher prices
(activity rule).
In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we consider the case of two
bidders whose valuations are i.i.d. random variables drawn from the continuous
distribution function F with support (0,1).
The auctioneer is either committed to stick to the announced reserve price r (referred
to type t = c) or he is free to revoke the reserve in the event when no bids are
forthcoming (referred to as type t = n). Bidders have non-degenerate prior beliefs
3In Bagwell (1995), imperfect observability destroys the value of commitment in the pure strategy
equilibrium of his game. However, his game has also two mixed strategy equilibria, in one of which
the value of commitment is restored (see Hurkens and Damme, 1997).
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and assume that the auctioneer is not committed with probability q0 ∈ (0,1). Bidders
update their beliefs after observing the reserve price.
3 Equilibrium bidding for given beliefs
We first solve the bidding subgames that are played after the auctioneer has an-
nounced the reserve and bidders have updated their beliefs, if possible. Bidders
beliefs are denoted by q(r) := Pr{t˜ = n|r}.
Of course, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for those who bid. However,
bidders “speculate” and strategically abstain from bidding if their valuation is greater
than the the reserve but not “too high”.
Proposition 1. Bidders’ play the equilibrium cutoff strategy and bid truthfully if
their valuations is greater or equal to γ , where:
γ− r = q(γ−E(X |X ≤ γ)), (1)
and otherwise abstain from bidding. Therefore, γ = 1 if r ≥ rˆ := 1−q+qE(X) and
γ < 1 otherwise.
Proof. First, suppose bidders play a symmetric cutoff strategy. Then, a bidder
whose valuation is equal to the cutoff value γ must be indifferent between bidding
and not bidding. If that bidder wins, he pays r; if he does not bid and no one else
bid and the auctioneer is type n, all bidders bid truthfully in the subsequent auction
Therefore, ∫ γ
0
(γ− r)dF(y) = q
∫ γ
0
(γ− y)dF(y). (2)
Rearranging yields the function γ(r,q) as the solution of (1).
Uniqueness of γ follows from the fact that (1− q)γ + qE(X |X ≤ γ)) is strictly
increasing and equal to zero at γ = 0 and equal to rˆ and γ = 1, so that for all r < rˆ
there must be a γ at which equation (1) is satisfied.
Therefore, γ = 1 if r ≥ rˆ := 1−q+qE(X) and γ < 1 otherwise.
Second, we show in the Appendix that bidders’ equilibrium strategy must be a
cutoff strategy.
The seller’s expected revenues are (the joint p.d.f. of the two order statistics is
f12(v,z) = 2 f (v) f (z) for v≥ z and zero otherwise):
pic(r,q) =
∫ 1
γ(r,q)
∫ v
γ(r,q)
z f(12)(v,z)dzdv+
∫ 1
γ(r,q)
∫ γ(r,q)
0
r f(12)(v,z)dzdv
=
∫ 1
γ(r,q)
∫ v
γ(r,q)
z f(12)(v,z)dzdv+2rF(γ(r,q))(1−F(γ(r,q)))
(3)
4
pin(r,q) = pic(r,q)+
∫ γ(r,q)
0
∫ v
0
z f(12)(v,z)dzdv
= pic(r,q)+2
∫ γ(r,q)
0
z(F(γ(r,q))−F(z)) f (z)dz.
(4)
Lemma 1. Denote the second largest order static of the sample of the two i.i.d.
valuations by X(2:2). One has:
r ≥ 1−q+qE(X)⇒ pic(r,q) = 0 and pin(r,q) = E(X(2:2)) (5)
r = 0⇒ pic(r,q) = pin(r,q) = E(X(2:2)) (6)
q = 1⇒ pin(r,q) = E(X(2:2)). (7)
Proof. By (1), r ≥ 1−q+qE(X)⇒ γ(r,q) = 1; this proves (5).
Obviously, r = 0⇒ γ = 0; using the fact that 2(1−F(y)) f (y) is equal to the p.d.f.
of the second-highest order statistic, X(2:2), this confirms (6).
The proof of (7) is in two steps: 1) by (1), q = 1⇒ r = E(X |X ≤ γ). 2) Moreover,
using 1):
2rF(γ(r,1))(1−F(γ(r,1))) = 2
∫ γ(r,1)
0
zdF(z)(1−F(γ(r,1))
= 2
∫ γ(r,1)
0
zdF(z)
∫ 1
γ(r,1)
dF(v)
=
∫ 1
γ(r,1)
∫ γ(r,1)
0
z f(12)(z,v)dzdv.
Therefore, pic(r,1) =
∫ 1
γ(r,1)
∫ v
0 z f(12)(z,v)dzdv, pin(r,1) =
∫ 1
0
∫ v
0 z f(12)(z,v)dzdv =
E
(
X(2:2)
)
.
Result (7) indicates that type n cannot benefit from using a positive reserve price
if bidders believe that he is type n with probability 1. This property is an essential
element of our analysis.
4 Equilibrium reserve price
The game may have equilibria in pure and in mixed strategies. The equilibria in
pure strategies are either separating or pooling. The equilibria in mixed strategies
are either separating, which occurs if the supports of strategies are disjoint, or
(partial) pooling, which occurs if the intersection of the supports is not empty. In
the following we show which of these applies.
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Proposition 2. 1) The game has no separating equilibrium (in pure or in mixed
strategies) in which type c employs a positive reserve price, rc > 0. 2) However,
there are separating equilibria with rc = 0; in these equilibria commitment has no
value.
Proof. 1) Suppose the game has a separating equilibrium, (rc,rn,γ(r,q),q(r)) with
rc > 0. Then, one must have q(rc) = 0, q(rn) = 1, and
E(X(2:2)) = pin(rn,q(rn))≥ pin(rc,q(rc))> pic(rc,q(rc))≥ pic(0,q(0)) = E(X(2:2)),
which is a contradiction.
This argument applies also to separating mixed equilibria, where the supports of the
seller’s strategies are disjoint.
2) Consider rc = 0,rn > 0 and the belief system
q(r) =
{
0 if r = 0
1 otherwise.
(8)
Then, pic(r,1) ≤ pin(r,1), by (4). Therefore, given the belief system q(r) type c
cannot benefit if he deviates from rc = 0. Moreover, at the given belief system type
n earns a payoff equal to E(X(2:2)), for all r. Therefore, type n cannot benefit if he
deviates from r = rn either.
Proposition 3. The game has pooling equilibria in pure strategies.
Proof. Assume the belief system q(r) = 1 if r = r∗ and q(r) = 0 otherwise. Then,
one obtains a pooling equilibrium in which both types set the common reserve price
r∗, for all r∗ for which
pic(r∗,q0)≥ pic(0,q0) = E(X(2:2)).
In order to prove this, use the fact that for all r 6= r∗, q(r) = 1 and:
pin(r∗,q0)≥ pic(r∗,q0)≥ pic(0,q0) = E(X(2:2)) = pin(r,1)≥ pic(r,1).
Therefore, neither type c nor type n can benefit by deviating from r = r∗.
A particular pooling equilibrium is obtained for r∗= 0, because obviously pin(0,q0)=
pic(0,q0).
Proposition 4. The game has no mixed strategy equilibrium in which the supports
of strategies have more than one element in common.
Proof. Suppose the intersection contains at least two elements, denoted by r1,r2.
Then, both types must be indifferent between them, i.e.,
pic(r1,q(r1)) = pic(r2,q2) and pin(r1,q(r1)) = pin(r2,q2).
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Let qi := q(ri),γi := γ(ri,qi), i ∈ {1,2}. By the above one must have, step-by-step:
pin(r1,q1)−pic(r1,q1) = pin(r2,q2)−pic(r2,q2)∫ γ1
0
∫ v
0
z f(12)(v,z)dzdv =
∫ γ2
0
∫ v
0
z f(12)(v,z)dzdv
γ1 = γ2 =: γ∗
0 = pic(r1,q1)−pic(r2,q2) = (r1− r2)
∫ 1
γ∗
∫ γ∗
0
f(12)(v,z)dzdv
γ∗ = 1
pic(r1,q1) = 0.
However, this cannot be an equilibrium, because by choosing r = 0 type c can assure
himself an expected profit equal to E(X(2:2)).
Proposition 5. The game has no partial pooling equilibrium with the following
properties: type n randomizes, and the single element that is common to the supports
of the strategies of c and n, which is denoted by r∗, is positive.
Proof. Suppose there is such an equilibrium in which the common element of the
supports is denoted by r∗ >0. Let rn 6= r∗ be another element of the support of type
n’s mixed strategy. r∗
First notice that in equilibrium one has q(r∗) < 1 because if q(r∗) were equal to
one, type c could increase his payoff by setting r = 0 in lieu of r∗.
In equilibrium type n must be indifferent between choosing r∗ and rn, which implies
pin(r∗,q(r∗)) = pin(rn,1)) = E(X(2:2)). (9)
By (4) and the fact that r ≥ rˆ⇒ γ(r,q) = 1, one has
pin(r∗,q(r∗)) =
{
E(X(2:2)) if r∗ ≥ rˆ
E(X(2:2))+ξ otherwise.
(10)
Let q∗ := q(r∗),γ∗ := γ(r∗,q∗). In order to sign ξ , recall that r∗ = (1− q∗)γ∗+
q∗E(X |X ≤ γ∗) by (1). Therefore, for all r∗ ∈ (0, rˆ):
ξ : = r∗
∫ 1
γ∗
∫ γ∗
0
f(12)(v,z)dzdv−
∫ 1
γ∗
∫ γ∗
0
z f(12)(v,z)dzdv
= 2r∗F(γ∗)(1−F(γ∗))−2
∫ 1
γ∗
∫ γ∗
0
z f (z) f (v)dzdv
= 2((1−q∗)γ∗+q∗E(X |X ≤ γ∗))F(γ∗)(1−F(γ∗))
−2E(X |X ≤ γ∗)F(γ∗)(1−F(γ∗))
= 2(1−q∗)(γ∗−E(X |X ≤ γ∗))F(γ∗)(1−F(γ∗))> 0.
(11)
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By (9)-(11) one must have r∗ ≥ rˆ. However, for all r∗ ≥ rˆ one has γ∗ = 1, and hence
pic(r∗,q∗) = 0. But then it is profitable for type c to deviate to r = 0 because he
then earns the higher payoff pic(0,q) = E(X(2:2)), regardless of bidders’ beliefs q.
Therefore, the candidate mixed equilibrium is not an equilibrium.
This result has a simple intuitive explanation. If there were such a partial pooling
(mixed strategy) equilibrium, the payoff of type n when he chooses an action rn 6= r∗
(and thus is recognized as type n with certainty) must be equal to E(X(2:2)), by (7).
Therefore, by the indifference condition of a mixed equilibrium, one must also have
pin(r∗,q∗) = E(X(2:2)). But this is only possible if either r∗ = 0 (which is excluded
by assumption) or γ∗ = 1, which implies pic(r∗,q∗) = 0. But then r∗ cannot be an
equilibrium strategy because by choosing r = 0 type c can assure himself a higher
payoff equal to E(X(2:2)).
We conclude that the game may only have partial pooling equilibria in which
either only type c randomizes or n randomizes and the one common element of the
supports of equilibrium strategies is r∗ = 0. However, as we show next, if there is
such an equilibrium, it violates the intuitive criterion.
5 Equilibrium selection
Proposition 6. Eliminating all (partial) pooling equilibria that violate the intuitive
criterion yields the unique pooling equilibrium with r∗ = 0. In that equilibrium,
commitment has no value.
Proof. We break down the assertion into two parts: 1) the pooling equilibrium with
r∗ = 0 does not violate the intuitive criterion, and 2) all other pooling (or partial
pooling) equilibria violate it.
1) Suppose there exists an r′ > 0 from which type c can benefit if he thus convinces
bidders that he is type c, i.e., pic(r′,0) > pic(0,q(0)) = E(X(2:2)). Then, if type n
mimics c and also plays r′ and thus convinces bidders that he is type c, he benefits
even more, because by (4), (3),
pin(r′,0)≥ pic(r′,0)> E(X(2:2)) = pin(0,q(0)).
2) Consider any pooling (or partial pooling) equilibrium in which r∗ is the unique
element of the intersection of the supports of strategies. We show below that there
exists an action r′ < r∗ such that pic(r′,0) > pic(r∗,q0) and pin(r′,0) < pin(r∗,q0).
Deviating to that action r′ should convince bidders that the auctioneer is type c
because type n cannot benefit from such a deviation even under the most favorable
change of beliefs q(r′) = 0.
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Figure 1: Elimination of implausible beliefs by the intuitive criterion
First notice that q(r∗)≥ q0 > 0 because type n does not randomize by Proposition
5.
Let ∆i(r) := pii(r,0)− pii(r∗,q0), i ∈ {c,n}. These functions have the following
properties, which are summarized in Figure 1:
a) The functions intersect at r1 := γ(r∗,q0) > r∗, because ∆c(r1) = ∆n(r1) ⇒
γ(r1,0) = γ(r∗,q0) and γ(r1,0) = r1 by (1).
b) ∆c(0)≤ 0, because pic(0,0) = E(X(2:2))≤ pic(r∗,q0).
c) ∆c(r∗)> 0, because pic(r,q) is strictly decreasing in q.
d) There exists an r0 ∈ [0,r∗) at which ∆c(r0) = 0.
e) For all r ∈ [0,r1): ∆c(r)< ∆n(r), because γ(r,0) = r and hence
∂rpin(r,0) = ∂rpic(r,0)+∂r
(∫ r
0
∫ v
0
z f(12)(v,z)dzdv
)
> ∂rpic(r,0).
From a)-e) it follows that there exists a nonempty interval (as illustrated by the
interval (r0,r2) in Figure 14 ) so that all r′ chosen from that interval constitute a
deviation that induces the asserted belief change.
Altogether, we thus arrive at the paradoxical conclusion:
4Figure 1 is actually an exact representation of the uniform distribution case.
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Corollary 1. After eliminating implausible beliefs that violate the intuitive criterion,
in equilibrium commitment has no value even if the prior probability of facing an
uncommitted type of auctioneer is arbitrarily small.
6 Discussion
We mention that if the number of bidders is increased, the threshold level of bid-
der participation γ tends to diminish. In other words, the probability of bidders’
speculative behavior diminishes. Therefore, the speculation induced by imperfect
commitment becomes less prominent when the number of bidders is large.
The above analysis of the open, ascending-bid English clock auction also applies to
a second-price sealed bid auction, provided the reserve is defined as the minimum
price a bidder has to pay if he wins. However, if the reserve is defined as a minimum
bid, the analysis differs. In that case, all bidders will bid, even those with low
valuations, but those whose valuation is higher than the reserve price but relatively
close to it, will shade their bid, speculating on the event that the second-highest
bid is sufficiently below the reserve. Therefore, if the reserve is a minimum bid
requirement the English clock auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction are
not revenue equivalent.
One may wonder whether the model can be extended in such a way that it can
explain why a positive reserve price is used that is not always revoked. Based on
the well-known resolution of the well-known Chain-Store paradox by Kreps and
Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), one may think that reputation
building in a model of repeated auctions may also contribute to resolve the present
paradox. More specifically, one may conjecture that the uncommitted auctioneer
uses a positive reserve and does not revoke it with positive probability during the
early auctions, and revokes it and then returns to the zero reserve pattern only in a
limited number final auctions.
A Appendix
A.1 Supplement to the proof of Proposition 1
Here we show that bidders’ equilibrium strategy must be a cutoff strategy.
Consider a measurable set X ⊂ [0,1]. Define m(X) := ∫X dF(x) and µ(X) :=∫
X xdF(x)/m(X), i.e., m(X) is the probability that a bidder’s value belongs to X and
µ(X) the average of values that belong to X .
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Lemma A.1. In any equilibrium, if bidder i with value v participates in the first
round, then all types of i with values greater than v also participate in the first
round.
Proof. Let X1 be the set of the opponent’s types that participate in the first round
and X0 be the complement of X1. Also define
XL1 : = X1∩{x | x≤ v}
XH1 : = X1∩{x | x > v}
XL0 : = X0∩{x | x < r}
XH0 : = X0∩{x | x≥ r}
XHL0 : = X
H
0 ∩{x | x≤ v}
XHH0 : = X
H
0 ∩{x | x > v}
Then the expected payoff of bidder i with value v if he participates in the first round
(UPi (v)) and that if he does not participate in the first round (U
NP
i (v)) are
UPi (v) = m(X0)(v− r)+m(XL1 )(v−µ(XL1 ))
UNPi (v) = q
[
m(XL0 )(v−µ(XL0 ))+m(XHL0 )(v−µ(XHL0 ))
]
For some v′ > v define XHL1 := X
H
1 ∩{x | x≤ v′} and XHHL0 := XHH0 ∩{x | x≤ v′}.
Then the expected payoff of bidder i with value v′ if he participates in the first round
(UPi (v
′)) and that if he does not participate in the first round (UNPi (v
′)) are
UPi (v
′) = m(X0)(v′− r)+m(XL1 )(v′−µ(XL1 ))+m(XHL1 )(v′−µ(XHL1 ))
UNPi (v
′) = q
[
m(XL0 )(v
′−µ(XL0 ))+m(XHL0 )(v′−µ(XHL0 ))+m(XHHL0 )(v′−µ(XHHL0 ))
]
Hence, we have
UPi (v
′) =UPi (v)+
(
m(X0)+m(XL1 )
)
(v′− v)+m(XHL1 )(v′−µ(XHL1 ))
UNPi (v
′) =UNPi (v)+q
[(
m(XL0 )+m(X
HL
0 )
)
(v′− v)+m(XHHL0 )(v′−µ(XHHL0 ))
]
Because m(X0)≥m(XL0 )+m(XHL0 )+m(XHHL0 ), µ(XHHL0 )> v, and UPi (v)≥UNPi (v),
it follows that UPi (v
′)>UNPi (v
′).
Corollary A.1. In any equilibrium, if bidder i with value v does not participate in
the first round, then all types of i with values less than v do not participate in the
first round either.
Corollary A.2. In equilibrium every bidder plays a cutoff strategy: All types of
bidder i with values v < v∗i do not participate in the first round, and all types of i
with values v > v∗i participate in the first round for some v
∗
i ∈ [r,1].
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